Financial Markets Group

In the aftermath of Pfizer's failed takeover attempt, Professor Daniel Ferreira interviews Professor David Kershaw, who is an expert on UK takeover rules, about the role of such rules on the outcome of the proposed deal.

Contributors: Dr Tom Kirchmaier and Dr Hans-Christoph Hirt Dr Tom Kirchmaier talks to Dr Hans-Christoph Hirt surrounding the differing problems surrounding Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, and introduces a new series that looks into the various aspects of it. It will be followed by a longer debate held in Hong Kong later on in the year.

Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies – View from India Contributors - Nimesh Kampani; Chairman, Confederation of India Industry’s National Committee on Financial Markets; Chairman, JM Financial Group Dr Tom Kirchmaier, Corporate Governance at LSE

Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies – a Lost Cause? Contributors - Gary Greenberg, Head of Emerging Markets, Hermes Investment Management Dr Tom Kirchmaier, Corporate Governance at LSE

Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies – View from China Contributors - Dr Hans Hirt, Executive Director, Hermes Investment Management; Research Associate, Corporate Governance at LSE Michael Cheng, Research Director, China & Hong Kong, Asian Corporate Governance Association Professor Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiaotong University Dr Tom Kirchmaier, Corporate Governance at LSE

Are bankers overpaid? Professor Ulf Axelson argues that high pay levels in finance may be necessary to prevent misconduct, even if the lucky few landing these jobs are no more skilled or deserving than others. Contributors: Professor Ulf Axelson, Dr Tom Kirchmaier For more information, please visit:

What has caused the massive growth in CEO compensation? Prof Dirk Jenter presents historical evidence and explains that market forces are the most likely cause of the rise in CEO compensation. Contributors: Prof Dirk Jenter, Dr Tom Kirchmaier

The authors discuss the British regulation of executive remuneration, which is characterised by the unique feature of two votes, one forward looking on the company’s remuneration report, and one backward looking on the director’s annual remuneration package. Using the pay information disclosed by FTSE 100 companies, research shows that shareholders guide their vote by top line salary and appear to disregard the remaining substantial body of information provided to them. Shareholders differentiate between the two voting dimensions in about 23% of the cases. In contrast to the rationale of the legislation that introduced the two votes, however, differentiating voting behaviour is not driven by characteristics of the executive’s remuneration policy, but mainly by exceptionally positive future performance expectations. Contributors: Dr Carsten Gerner-Beuerle and Dr Tom Kirchmaier